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LIMITATIONS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
LIMITATIONS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY.
1. Since chattels personal were never subjects of feudal
tenure,' the creation of legal interests in them is not restricted
by the artificial rules which apply in the creation of legal
interests in realty. Though it may be proper to speak of the
seisin of chattels, 2 there has never been a principle that such
seisin cannot be put in abeyance. Land can only be held of
some one,3 but chattels may be owned absolutely.4 Strictly
speaking, estates in chattels are therefore impossible,5 for estate
connotes qualified ownership. Any disposition of a chattel,
unless it be by way of pledge or bailment, or unless otherwise
limited, will pass the absolute interest in it. Words of limita-
tion are unnecessary; while a conveyance of land to A formerly
passed but a life estate,' a similar gift of a chattel made him
absolute owner. The usual limitation of personalty to A, his
executors, administrators and assigns is no more effective than
a limitation to A.7  So a limitation to A and his heirs-the
words "and his heirs" are so much surplusage,' for there can
be no descent of personalty. A gift of personalty to A and the
1. Williams, Personal Property (16th ed.) 1 to 3.
2. See Professor Maitland's "The Seisin of Chattels," 1 Law Quar-
terly Review 324, and Professor Ames' "The Disseisin of Chattels," 3
Harvard Law Review 23.
3. In the United States a tenant in fee simple holds of the State,
unless tenure has been abolished, or Quia Emptores is not in force. Gray,
Perpetuities (2d ed.) §§ 22 et seq.; Williams, Real Property, (17th int. ed.)
68.
4. In mediaeval times chattels were probably not owned abso-
utely. 2 Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law (2d ed.) 150 to
153.
5. Williams, Real Property (17th int. ed.) 7, 365; Leake, Property
in Land (2d ed.) 3; Tiffany, Real Property, § 17, note; Schouler, Personal
Property, § 17.
6. This common law rule was changed by the Missouri Statute of
1855. Now Revised Statutes 1909, § 2870.
7. Jarman, Wills (6th ed.) 1182, 1617.
8. No joint ownership could result, for A cannot have heirs while
yet living, and the words are words of limitation, not of purchase. It is
possible that the context may show the word "heirs" to have been used
in another than its technical sense, to designate children, Jarman, Wills
(6th ed.) 1570, in which event joint ownership will result if children are
alive at the time of the gift. On the application of the Rule in Wild's
Case (1599) 6 Coke 16b, see infra.
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heirs of his body confers on A the absolute interest since an
estate tail cannot be created in such property,9 neither in chat-
tels personal nor chattels real.
2. Is the Rule in Shelley's Case,' ° or any similar rule,
applicable to personal property? The Missouri statutes
have abolished this Rule as to realty," but they do not in terms
apply to personalty." As originally applied, the Rule in Shel-
ley's Case had to do only with realty, for it was probably a
"rule of tenure founded on feudal principles."'" But more
recently, the statement is frequently made that "it is no less
applicable to gifts of personalty. "14 It is settled in the English
law that where a bequest is made to A for life and then to A's
4'executors, administrators and assigns," A takes the absolute
interest." This is only a rule of construction," but it is fre-
9. Halbert v. Halbert (1855) 21 Mo. 277; State ex rel. Haines v. Tolson(1880) 73 Mo. 320 (semble); Machen v. Machen (1849) 15 Ala. 373; In re
Walker (1908) 2 Ch. 705; 3 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 9, note 48;
Tiffany, Real Property, § 26; Jarman, Wills (6th ed.) 1193 (citing numer-
ous cases).
10. (1581) 1 Co. Rep. 93 b.
11. Revised Statutes 1825, p. 794; Ibid. 1845, c. 32, § 7; Ibid. 1865,
c. 108, § 6, now Ibid. 1909, § 2874. For a discussion of the effect of the
various changes made in the wording of this statute, see, 1 Law Series, Mis-
souri Bulletin, p. 10, note 35; p. 11, note 36.
12. The statute of 1845, Revised Statutes 1845, c. 32, § 7, provided
that the donees of the remainder should take as "purchasers," but its
phrasing applies only to realty; the statute of 1865, now Revised Statutes
1909, § 2874, provides for their taking as "purchasers in fee simple,"
which precludes its application to personalty. See also Revised Statutes
1909, § 578, which is expressly limited to devises of real estate.
13. Van Grutten v. Foxwell (1897) Appeal Cases 658, 668. See 23
Harvard Law Review 51.
14. Comfort v. Brown (1878) 10 Ch. Div. 146. See 29 L. R. A.(N. S.) 1146; 22 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 512, and cases cited.
15. Avern v. Lloyd (1868) L. R. 5 Eq. 383; Jarman, Wills (6th ed.)
1860; Theobald, Wills (5th ed.) 423; 4 Illinois Law Review 639.
The proposition stated in the text may be due to a statement of Lord
Coke's. Co. Lit. 54 b. The use of the word "assigns" tends to show
that the executors and administrators were not intended to take
beneficially. Grafftey v. Humpage (1838) 1 Beav. 46, 52; Williams,
Personal Property (16th ed.) 365. In Alger v. Parrott (1866) L. R. 3
Eq. 328, the remainder was given to "personal representatives," but
the original donee took absolutely.
16. Powell v. Boggis (1866) 35 Beav. 535, 541; Atkinson v. L'Es-
trange (1885) L. R. Ir., 15 Ch. 340, 343; Williams, Personal Property (16th
ed.) 365. Professor Kales well states the proposition in the text in 4
Illinois Law Review 639.
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quently referred to as analogous to the Rule in Shelley's Case. 17
Where the bequest is to A for life, with remainder to his heirs,
it has been held 18 that A takes the absolute interest by analogy
to the Rule in Shelley's Case, but the intention of the testator
for a different result will be effectuated. 9 Now the Rule in
Shelley's Case is a rule which defeats intention where neces-
sary.20 It would seem, therefore, that it is a rule of con-
struction instead of the Rule in Shelley's Case which is applied
to personal property. The more recent and better considered
cases hold that the Rule has no application to personalty, 21
and this view has met general approval from commenta-
tors .22
There is more difficulty where a bequest to A for life is
followed by a remainder to the heirs of A's body. In numerous
decisions it has been held that this confers an absolute interest
on A.23 This is probably to be attributed to a general rule of
construction that "terms, which, if applied to real property,
would give an estate tail, pass the absolute interest in personal
17. Glover v. Condell (1896) 163 Ill. 56 6; but see Lord v. Comstock
(1909) 240 Ill. 492; Knox v. Barker (1898) 8 N. D. 272.
18. Home v. Lyeth (1818) 4 Har. & J. (Md.) 431 (the decision is
by a nisi prius court). Cf. Hammer v. Smith (1853) 22 Ala. 433; Warner
v. Sprigg (1883) 62 Md. 14; Taylor v. Lindsay (1884) 14 R. I. 518; Knox
v. Barker (1898) 8 N. D. 272; Comfort v. Brown (1878) 10 Ch. Div. 146.
The American cases are discussed by Professor Kales in 4 Illinois Law
Review 639.
19. Dull's Estate (1890) 137 Pa. St. 112; Evans v. Weatherhead
(1902) 24 R. I. 502; Bennett v. Bennett (1905) 217 Ill. 434. But cf. Hughes
v. Niklas (1889) 70 Md. 484.
20. Tiffany, Real Property, § 132. Lord Mansfield expressed a
contrary view in Perrin v. Blake (1769) 1 W. BI. 672, but his decision
was overruled and is not law. See 5 Gray, Cases on Property (2d ed.)
89. But his conception of the Rule may have influenced the decision of
the personal property cases. 4 Illinois Law Review 643.
21. Smith v. Butcher (1878) 10 Ch. Div. 113; Jones v. Rees (Del.,
1908) 69 Atl. 785; Lord v. Comstock (1909) 240 Ill. 492.
22. 8 Columbia Law Review 573; 23 Harvard Law Review 51; 4
Illinois Law Review 643.
23. Dott v. Cunnington (S. C., 1794) 1 Bay 453 (deed); Polk v.
Faris (Tenn., 1836) 9 Yerg. 209 (deed); Watts v. Clardy (1848) 2 Fla.
369 (will and deed); Machen v. Machen (1849) 15 Ala. 373 (will); Powell
v. Brandon (1852) 24 Miss. 343 (will); Hampton v. Rather (1855) 30 Miss.
193 (deed); Hughes v. Niklas (1889) 70 Md. 484 (leasehold); Mason v.
Pate (1859) 34 Ala. 379; Smith v. McCormick (1874) 46 Ind. 135. The
English cases are in accord. Garth v. Baldwin (1755) 2 Ves. 646; Theo-
bald, Wills (5th ed.) 424.
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property. ,,24 As a rule of construction, it should yield to a
clear expression of intention," and the more recent cases show
a tendency toward this liberalization." It may be doubted
whether terms which would create an estate tail in realty only
by implication should ever be held to give an absolute estate
in personalty," unless such an intention is clearly expressed.
Logically, the Rule in Shelley's Case cannot be applied where
the later gift is to "heirs of the body" unless it is also to be
applied where the later gift is to "heirs." It is submitted that
the Rule has no application to personalty and that the
cases which profess to apply it may all be explained on other
grounds. Though the Rule was recognized in Missouri as
applying to realty before the statutes abolished it,25 there is no
reason for now applying it to personalty, and the fact of its
abolition as to realty is strong reason against such application.2 1
3. Does the Rule in Wild's Case,"° or any similar rule,
apply to personal property? This Rule is a rule of construction
to the effect that "if a devise is made to A and his children,
24. Halbert v. Halbert (1855) 21 Mo. 277.
25. Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.) § 647, note 3. In Audsley v. Horn
(1859) 1 De G. F. & J. 226, 236, Lord Campbell said, "The general
rule, that words in a will which create an estate tail in realty will give an
absolute interest in personalty, is founded upon the desire to give effect
to the intention of the testator as far as the rules of law will permit.
But the rule ought not to prevail where it would entirely defeat the in-
tention of the testator, and where, without any violation of the rules of
law, the intention of the testator may be carried into effect."
26. Ex parte Wynch (1854) 5 De G. M. & G. 188 (gift of an annuity
to A for life and then to her issue. Held, A takes for life only); Tingley
v. Harris (1898) 20 R. I. 517; In re Bishop and Richardson's Contract
(1899) 1 1. R. 72.
27. 3 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 9, note 48; Tothill v. Pitt,
(1816) 1 Madd. 488.
28. Riggins v. McClellon (1859) 28 Mo. 23; Tesson v. Newman
(1876) 62 Mo. 198.
29. Sands v. Old Colony Trust Co. (1907) 195 Mass. 575. But cf.
Powell v. Brandon (1852) 24 Miss. 343. In the latter case it is not clear
that the Rule had been abrogated as to realty.
30. (1599) 6 Coke 16b. The rule as stated in Wild's Case was not
involved by its facts: "If A devises his lands to B and to his children or
issue, and he hath not any issue at the time of the devise, that the same
is an estate tail; for the intent of the devisor is manifest and certain that
his children or issues should take and as immediate devisees they cannot
take, because they are not in rerum natura, and by way of remainder
they cannot take, for that was not his intent, for the gift is immediate,
therefore there such words shall be taken as words of limitation."
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and A has children living at the time of the devise, A and the
children are at common law joint tenants 1' for life; if A has,
at that time, no children he takes an estate tail. '"32 In the
latter event, "children" is a word of limitation. The reason
for the Rule is well stated by Lord St. Leonards, "because
the children cannot take, not being in rerum nalura at the
time of the devise; therefore an estate tail is given to the parent
in order that it may descend upon them." 3  Obviously, no
such reason exists for construing gifts of personalty for no
estate tail in personalty can be created, and if the parent were
given an absolute interest, his children could never take by
descent. To confer an estate tail in realty on the parent is to
make some provision (not certain, in view of the possibility
of docking the entail) for the children; but an absolute interest
in personalty in the parent is in no sense a provision for the
children. When personalty is given to A and his children and
no children are alive at the time, A becomes absolute owner
because an immediate gift is intended and A is the only donee
to take.34 This result is reached without any application of
the Rule in Wild's Case. But if an annuity were so given, A
would take only for life unless the Rule in Wild's Case be
applied.3' In Doe d. Gigg v. Bradley,36 the word "children"
was held to be a word of limitation, as a matter of construction,
but the Rule in Wild's Case was not mentioned. On the au-
thority of that case, Lord Brougham in Heron v. Stokes," said
entirely obiter, that the Rule applies to personalty. But in
Audsley v. Horn,5 Lord Campbell, who took part in the decision
of Heron v. Stokes, held "deliberately" that the Rule does not
31. In Missouri, today, they would be tenants in common unless
otherwise designated. Revised Statutes 1909, § 2878.
32. 5 Gray, Cases on Property (2d ed.) 250.
33. Heron v. Stokes (1842) 4 Ir. Eq. 284, 291.
34. Jarman, Wills (6th ed.) 1915.
35. Ibid. 1138; Nichols v. Hawkes (1853) 10 Hare 342; Blight v.
Hartnoll (1879) 19 Ch. Div. 294.
36. (1812) 16 East 399.
37. (1845) 12 Cf. & F. 161. Previous decisions of the same case are
reported in 3 Ir. Eq. 163 and 4 Ir. Eq. 284. In the latter, Lord St. Leon-
ards (then Sir Edward Sugden) was clearly of the opinion that the Rule
in Wild's Case has no application to personalty.
38. (1859) 1 De G. F. & J. 226 (affirming 26 Beav. 195).
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apply to personalty. This seems to be settled in English law."
In the United States, only one case seems to have applied
the Rule in Wild's Case to personalty, and it was poorly con-
sidered. In Johnson v. Johnson,4" there was a gift of land and
slaves to A "and her children after her." A was held to be
absolute owner of the slaves as a result of the Rule. It is
submitted that on the authority of the English cases the Rule
in Wild's Case should not be applied to personalty in Missouri. 4'
4. Does the doctrine of cy pres apply to personalty? If
land is devised to an unborn person for life, remainder to his
children and the heirs of their bodies, the unborn person takes
an estate tail, 42 else the interest in the children would be de-
feated entirely on account of remoteness.43 This is the doctrine
of cy pres.44  Does a similar doctrine apply to personalty so
that a gift of personalty to an unborn person for life, remainder
to his children and the heirs of their bodies, will pass the ab-
solute interest to such unborn person? The whole doctrine
is one of approximation to an expressed intent. But as to
personalty its application will not accomplish such approxi-
mation, since the children could not take by descent from their
parent. It is submitted, therefore, that the doctrine should
not be applied to gifts of personalty. 45
39. Buffar v. Bradford (1741) 2 Atk. 220; In re Jones (1910) 1 Ch.
167; Jarman, Wills (6th ed.) 1915.
40. (S. C., 1842) 1 McMullan Eq. 345. But cf. Cleveland v. Havens(1860) 13 N. J. Eq. 101. The result of Johnson v. Johnson can be achieved
independently of the Rule in Wild's Case, as shown by the text.
41. The Missouri Courts have apparently never been called upon
to apply the Rule in Wild's Case to either realty or personalty: In Allen
v. Claybrook (1874) 58 Mo. 124, children were in existence at the time
of the devise. Cf. Kinney v. Matthews (1879) 69 Mo. 520; 1 Law Series,
Missouri Bulletin, p. 11, note 40.
42. Humbertson v. Humbertson (1716) 1 P. Wins. 332; Gray, Per-
petuities (2d ed.) §§ 643 et seq.; 17 Harvard Law Review 559.
43. 1 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 10. This is one of the cases
in which the rule against perpetuities has influenced construction.
44. It is to be carefully distinguished from the doctrine of cy pres
which is applied to gifts of both realty and personalty to charities. 3
Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 22.
45. Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.) § 647, note 3. Cf. Routledge v.
Dorril (1794) 2 Ves. Jr. 357; Somerville v. Lethbridge (1795) 6 T. R. 213.
It may be noted here that the Rule in Whitby v. Mitchell (1890) 44
Ch. Div. 85, discussed in 3 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 29, does not
apply to personalty. In re Bowles (1902) 2 Ch. 650.
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5. The discussion of the foregoing questions has been
evoked by the recent decision of State ex ret. Farley v. Welsh.
46
A testator divided his property, real and personal, into fifths,
one of which he gave to his daughter Agnes and the heirs of
her body; other fifths were given to other children "absolutely."
There was a proviso that Agnes should "take and keep all of
the legacy under this will as her own separate estate to the
exclusion of her husband." It was admitted, if indeed it had
not been previously decided 47 that under the statute abolishing
estates tail 18 Agnes got only a life estate in the realty. It was
contended that she got the absolute interest in the personalty.
The Rule in Shelley's Case had no application since no remain-
der was expressly limited to the heirs of Agnes' body.49 Agnes
had no children when the testator died, and the court talked
about the application of the Rule in Wild's Case, saying that
it applies to personal property.50 But even if this were true,
the facts of this case would not call for its application, for the
Rule should not be applied to personalty where it would not
be applied to realty, and an estate tail in the realty was ex-
pressly limited. The Court did not apply the Rule, but be-
cause Agnes' gift was not in the same terms as gifts to other
children, it found an intention that Agnes should take but a
life interest with a remainder to the heirs of her body. 51 It
46. (1913) 175 Mo. App. 303, 162 S. W. 637.
47. (1911) 237 Mo. 128.
48. Revised Statutes 1909, § 2872 was in force in 1889, when the
testator died.
49. On this point, the first headnote in 162 S. W. 637 is misleading.
50. The court cites, for this dictum, Heron v. Stokes (1845) 12 Cl.
& F. 161; Byng v. Byng (1862) 10 H. L. C. 171; Clifford v. Koe (1880) 5
App. Cases 447. None of these cases is authority for the court's dictum.
Heron v. Stokes is discussed supra. In Byng v. Byng, only realty was
involved, though the gift included heirlooms also. In Clifford v. Koe,
the Rule was applied to realty, but the question of its applying to per-
sonalty was not even raised.
51. The possibility of so-called remainders in personal property
following life interests, is now well recognized in Missouri. Threlkeld v.
Threlkeld (1911) 238 Mo. 459; Gibson v. Gibson (1911) 239 Mo. 490;
Zook v. Welty (1911) 156 Mo. App. 703. For a discussion of "Future
Interests in Personal Property," see 14 Harvard Law Review 397. It
may be doubted whether executory interests in personalty can be created
in Missouri by deed. Wilson v. Cockrell (1843) 8 Mo. 1. See Gray,
Perpetuities (2d ed.) § 91; 3 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 7. Appar-
ently, the nature of future interests in chattels real has not been discussed
in the Missouri decisions.
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may well be doubted whether such an intention appears in
the will, and the proviso for Agnes' taking, "all of the legacy
. . .as her own separate estate" would seem to negative
it. It is not clear that the court recognized the well-established
rule that a gift of personalty to A and the heirs of his body
confers the absolute interest on A.12 The result of the decision
is that though the words "heirs of the body" were read as
words of limitation as to the realty, they were given the effect
of creating a remainder in the personalty."5
MANLEY 0. HUDSON.
52. This is evidenced by the court's statement that "applying this
rule [in Wild's Case] to the case before us, we would be compelled to hold
that the words of the will gave an estate in fee tail to Agnes, and unless
defeated before death, in some of the ways permissible in such estates,
would go in succession by descent, and not by purchase, to these plain-
tiffs as after-born children." The will shows no intention to use the
words "heirs of the body" to mean "children." See note 8, supra.
53. It is true that the same words in a will may be construed dif-
ferently as to realty and personalty. Forth v. Chapman (1720) 1 P. Wins.
663; 3 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 8. But they should never be
construed, as in the principal case, as words of limitation as to the realty
and as words of purchase as to the personalty.
